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RECENT CASES

I

HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONSORTIUM-WIFE
PERMITTED TO RECOVER FOR LOSS
OF HUSBAND'S CONSORTIUM
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82,
215 A.2d 1 (1965).
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America1 held that a wife may recover for the
loss of her husband's consortium caused by the negligent act of a
third party.2 Plaintiff alleged that her husband was seriously injured when defendant's gas line exploded. Plaintiff's husband subsequently became inactive, engaged in no social activities and was
totally unable to have sexual relations with his wife. The plaintiff
thus sought money damages for the loss of her husband's consortium. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
supreme court, however, held that if the company's negligent
maintenance of the gas line caused the injury to the husband and
consortium deprivation to the wife, it could be held liable to the
wife for her losses.
Historically, any interference with the husband's right to his
wife's services, custody, property or conjugal affection gave rise to
a right of action for loss of consortium.3 This was allowed whether
4
the injury to the wife was intentional or negligent. The common
law, however, did not recognize any consortium action in the wife
due to the medieval concept that during the marriage the legal
5
existence of the wife was one with the husband. With the adop6
tion of the Married Women's Acts some state courts began recognizing the wife's consortium action when the defendant's wrong
1. 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965).
2. The court noted that the consortium claim of the wife may be
prosecuted only if joined with the husband's action.
3. See HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 8.9 (1956); SALMOND, TORTS § 179
(12th ed. 1957); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22
MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1963).
4.

See HARPER & JAMES, op. Cit. supra note 3.

5. See 1 Blackstone, Commentories *443. Blackstone stated that the
very being or logical existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection and cover she performs everything.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 § 111 (1965) provides: "Hereafter a married
woman may sue and be sued civilly in all respects, and in any form of
action, and with the same effect and results and consequences as an unmar"
ried person. ..
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was an intentional one.7 The intentional tort limitation was
harshly criticized in Hitaffer v. Argonne.8 The court went on to
permit the wife to maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from the negligent injury of her husband.9
The reasoning in Hitaffer rested on two basic premises:
the husband and wife have equal rights in the marriage relation,
which should receive equal protection of the law;' 0 the objections
to allowing recovery for negligent invasion of consortium are illfounded, and equality of treatment should not be attained by
There is an increasing numdenying the action to both spouses.'
ber of states which expressly follow Hitaffer.'2 A majority of the
states, however, do not follow Hitaffer, denying the wife a cause
of action. 13
7. See HARPER, LAW OF TORTS, 565 (1963); PROSSER, TORTS § 118 (3d
ed. 1964).
8. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
9. The Hitaffer court said:
There can be no doubt, therefore, that if a cause of action in
the wife for the loss of consortium from alienation of affections
or criminal conversation is to be recognized it must be predicated
on a legally protected interest. Now then, may we say that she
has a legally protected and hence actionable interest in her consortium when it is injured from one of these so-called intentional
invasions, and yet, when the very same interest is injured by a
negligent defendant, deny her a right of action? It does not seem
so to us. Such a result would be neither legal nor logical.
Id. at 817.
10. Id. at 816.
11. Id. at 814-19.
12. See Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont.
1961); Cooney v. Moomau, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Yonner v. Adams,
53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717 (Super. Ct. 1961); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee
Coaches Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Dini v. Naiditch, 20
Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmitt, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d
480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960);
Novak v. Kansas City Transit, 365 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. 1963); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Hoekstra
v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
Oregon passed a statute giving the wife the same civil rights as the
husband, "including . . . the right of action for loss of consortium of her
husband."

ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.010 (1955).

13. See Criqui v. Blau-Knox Corp., 318 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1963)
(Kansas law); Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So.2d 153
(1960); Jeune v. Del. E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954);
Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958);
Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P.2d 630, 634 (1955); Lockwood v.
Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); Ripley v. Ewell, 61
So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952); La Eace v. Concinnati, N. & C. Ry., 249 S.W.2d 534
(Ky. 1952); Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82
(1955); Snodgrass v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 103 N.H. 56, 164 A.2d 579
(1960); Larocca v. American Chain & Cable Co., 23 N.J. Super. 195, 92
A.2d 811 (App. Div. 1952); Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d
524, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354, 151 N.E.2d 898 (1958); Nelson v. A.M. Lockett & Co.,
206 Okl. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952); Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162
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There are several arguments advanced for denying the wife a
cause of action. One argument is that the wife's interest is too
remote from the injury to her husband to warrant legal protection 14 It is argued, however, in those jurisdictions which allow the
husband to recover, that the same injury to the husband's interest
has never been regarded as too remote when he brings an action
for loss of his wife's consortium. 15 It is inconsistent to hold that
injuries to a wife are too remote and at the same time maintain
that injuries to a husband are not too remote for a cause of action
based on consortium to exist.1 6 The wife's loss is as immediate
and direct as the husband's would be if she had been the subject
of the accident.' 7 The Ekalo court noted that the absence of any
claim on the wife's part for loss of services should not defeat her
action. Such a factor would not defeat an action by her husband
when he does not seek any compensaton for loss of services as
such, but does seek compensation for loss of his wife's aid, comfort
and conjugal fellowship.' 8
Another argument is advanced to deny the wife a cause of
action. It is felt that to allow such an action would result in a
"double recovery" for the same injury. 9 The wife's right to
consortium, however, involves a great deal more than mere support.20 Love, affection, comfort, sexual intercourse and other sentimental elements are parts of consortium. The wife's action
would be confined to her independent loss of consortium, exclusive
of any impairment of her husband's earning capacities for which
he would be compensated. 21 In Dini v. Naiditch2 2 the court noted
that "double recovery" could easily be prevented by specifically
restricting the wife's recovery to her own elements of loss which
are in no way compensable in the husband's action.
A.2d 662 (1960); Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962); Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Ash v. S.S.
Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953); Seagraves v. Legg, 127
S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1962); Nickel v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 269 Wis. 647,
70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
14. See Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Gambino v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158 S.W. 77
(1913); Larocca v. American Chain & Cable Co., 23 N.J. Sup. 195, 92 A.2d
811 (1952); Feneff v. New York Central and H. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89
N.E. 436 (1909).
15. See Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Montgomery v. Stephens,

359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).

16. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
17. See Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
18. 46 N.J. 82, 87, 215 A.2d 1, 5 (1965).
19. See Giggey v. Gallagher Transport Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100
(1937); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918).
20. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106 (1959); Acuff v. Schmit,
248 Ipwa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956).
21. 183 F.2d at 819.

22. 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
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It was also claimed in Ekalo that recognition of the wife's
cause of action may require the allowance of recovery to other
members of the family and inordinately expand defendant liability. 23 The Ekalo court rejected the argument, saying that,
"policy rather than logic is the determinative factor and, while
persuasive arguments may be mustered in favor of the child's
claim, the reciprocal recognition of the wife's claim may readily be
rested on its own footing 2' of
equality and justice without any com4
pulsion of going forward.
A fourth argument for denying the wife recovery is that any
remedy the wife may acquire can only come from the legislature. 25
This contention was rejected in Dini when the court noted that
"since the obstacles to the wife's action were 'judge-invented,'
there is no conceivable reason why they cannot be 'judge destroyed.' "26
A few courts, recognizing the inconsistency of denying the
wife's claim for consortium while permitting the husband to maintain a claim for loss of his wife's consortium, have rejected both
claims.27 Other states have abolished the action for loss of consortium by statute.2 A rationale given by these courts abolishing the husband's action is that his right was formerly based on
the subservient position of the wife and the husband's
common
29
law right to her services, and therefore is now outmoded.
Illustrative of a jurisdiction denying the wife a cause of action
for the loss of her husband's consortium caused by the negligent
act of a third party is Pennsylvania.3" In Neuberg v. Bobowicz83
the plaintiff was severely injured in an automobile accident caused
23. See Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662, 666 (1960).
24. 46 N.J. at 89, 215 A.2d at 7; See also Pleasant v. Washington Sand
and Gravel Co., 104 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
25. See Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960); In
Potter v. Schafter, 211 A.2d 811 (Me. 1965), the court held that the proposal to allow the wife to recover merited consideration by the legislature
since the court could not usurp legislative authority and judicially legislate a new cause of action.
26. 20 Ill.2d at 421, 170 N.E.2d at 892.
27. See Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330
(1956); Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945); Kronenbitter
v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 151 N.E.2d 898 (1958); Hawkins v.
Front St. Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021 (1892).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (1950); see Alspo v. Eastern Air Lines Inc.,
171 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1959); In West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal.2d
469, 477, 353 P.2d 929, 934 (1960), a California statute granting the husband an action to recover for the loss of the wife's services (CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 427) was interpreted to preclude recovery of any other elements of damage.
29. See Marri v. Stamford R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 22, 78 Atl. 582, 586 (1911);
Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 824, 32 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1945).
30. Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
31. 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
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by the alleged negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff's wife joined
in the action and based her claim solely upon the loss of her husband's consortium. A motion to strike from the complaint the
prayer of the wife was sustained by the lower court and affirmed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Moreover, in two recent
Pennsylvania cases3 2 the question has been raised as to whether
Pennsylvania still allows a husband to sue for damages for loss of
consortium.3 3 It appears from these cases that Pennsylvania might
deny the husband as well as the wife, any recovery.
In Ekalo the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a progressive and consistent principle by allowing the wife to recover for
the loss of her husband's consortium. Perhaps this decision will
encourage other states to re-evaluate their position on this issue
and either recognize the wife's cause of action or adopt a consistent
rule and deny both.
JERRY

32.

B.

SILVER

Castelli v. Pittsburgh Ry., 413 Pa. 17, 195 A.2d 794 (1963); Bedil-

lion v. Frazee, 408 Pa. 281, 183 A.2d 341 (1962).
33. In Castelli v. Pittsburgh Ry., 413 Pa. 17, 195 A.2d 794 (1963), Mr.
Justice Jones, in concurring, said:
In Bedillion v. Frazee, 408 Pa. 281, 183 A.2d 341, this court
without any mention of Neuberg, continued to recognize the existence of the husband's right. However, three of the six members
of the Court who.sat in Bedillion concurred only in the result.
In my opinion, the question whether this Court now grants
recognition to the right of a husband to sue for damages for loss
of consortium should be clarified for the sake of the bench and
bar. However, such question should be determined only in a case
where that question has been properly raised, briefed and argued.
In the case at bar, such question has not been raised, briefed nor
argued, and to the extent that the majority opinion now continues
to grant recognition to the right of the husband, I dissent.
Id. at 22, 195 A.2d at 797.

ADMIRALTY -

UNSEAWORTHINESS

-

DEFECTIVE

SLING OWNED BY STEVEDORING COMPANY
AND ATTACHED TO SHORE BASED CRANE
RENDERS SHIP UNSEAWORTHY
Metzger v. S.S. Kirsten Torm, 245 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 1965)
William F. Metzger, a longshoreman, was killed while working
aboard the S.S. Kirsten Torm. A wire sling, attached to a crane,
was being used to lower steel billets into the ship's hold. The wire
broke, and the billets struck Metzger. The sling, owned by Jarka
Stevedoring Company, was attached to a shore based crane which
was owned and operated by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
The sling was new, without any apparent defects. A microscopic
examination, however, showed a number of cracks which indicated
that the wire was uncommonly brittle. The shore based crane was
being used for loading operations because the weight of the drafts
was far beyond the capacity of the ship's booms. The slings were
supplied by the stevedoring company because the ship did not carry slings suitable for such loading operations. None of the stevedore's gear was attached to any part of the ship. The district court
in Metzger v. S.S. Kirsten Torm1 held that the sling was an appurtenance of the ship, and the vessel was unseaworthy and liable.
The decision in this-case primarily rests upon an unrevealing
per curiam opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Alaska
S.S. Co. v. Petterson,2 which itself was founded upon prior decisions 3 affording no justification for the result reached. This Note
will analyze two lines of case law which have extended the doctrine
of unseaworthiness in two different areas and analyze the 4 result
reached when these two extensions of the doctrine converge.
The liability of a shipowner for the unseaworthy condition of
his Vessel is of fairly modern origin.5 None of the ancient sea codes
contained a warranty of seaworthiness, 6 and early American deci1. 245 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 1965).
2. 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (per curiam), affirming, 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.
1954).
3. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), rehearing denied,
328 U.S. 878 (1946); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
4. Cf. Note, 68 DICK. L. REV. 207 (1965), wherein the expansion of the
doctrine of seaworthiness to include persons other than the ship's crew is

discussed.
5. For a well documented account of the historical development of the
doctrine of seaworthiness.see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 315-32 (1957);
2 NoRms, SEAMEN 705-889 (2d. ed. 1962); Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 755
(1961); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
6. See Laws of Oleron, Wisbuy, and Hanse. Towns. 30 Fed. Cas. 1171,
1189, 1197 (Appendix 1880).
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sions regarded these codes as fixing the limits of the owner's liability. 7 The Osceola" is recognized as the first American statement
of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The court said:
[T]he vessel and her owner are . . . liable ... for
injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in
order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. 9
The extent of this obligation was first mentioned by the Supreme Court in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger.0 Libelant, an
employee of Carlisle, was injured when he lit fuel he had obtained
from a can marked "coal oil." The can contained gasoline. Libelant
recovered on a theory of negligence. The Supreme Court, affirming
the recovery, added: "[W]e think the trial court might have told
the jury that without regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy when she left the dock if the can marked 'coal oil' contained gasoline."' 1
The Carlisle dictum appeared to characterize the owner's duty
as absolute. In England the owner's duty is only to exercise due
care to provide and maintain a seaworthy vessel. The duty is prescribed by the Merchant Shipping Act, 12 which has been narrowly
after the start of the voyage and
construed as to conditions arising
13
during the operation of the ship.
Any doubts which may have lingered as to the nature of the4
owner's duty were dispelled in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki'
"15
wherein the Court said: "It is a form of absolute duty ...
Sieracki's importance, however, lies in its extension of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness. Sieracki extended to longshoremen protection previously afforded only to crew members.
Libelant, an employee of a stevedoring company, was on board ship
operating a winch that controlled a ten-ton boom. Both the winch
and the boom were a part of the ship's equipment. A shackle supporting the boom broke and struck the libelant. The unseaworthiness of the vessel was not disputed. The principal question was
whether the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness extended to
longshoremen. The Court reasoned that since the longshoreman
was performing work formerly done by the ship's crew, he was to be
protected by the same warranty that protected the crew.' 6 Sier7. See, e.g., Hardin v. Gorden, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (D. Maine
1823); Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 425 (No. 11,641) (D. Mass. 1832).
8. 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (dictum).
9. Id. at 175.
10. 259 U.S. 255 (1922) (dictum).
11. Id. at 259 (dictum). (Emphasis added.)
12. 39 & 40 Victoria, Co. 80 § 5 (1876).
13. See, Hedley v. Pickney & Sons S.S. Co, A.C. 222 (1894).
14. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
15. Id. at 95.

16.

The longshoreman is covered by a federal compensation statute

intended to be the only remedy against the longshoreman's

employer.
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acki was followed in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.1'7 Both cases
dealt with defective equipment which was a part of the ship's
equipment. The typical cases applying the Sieracki doctrine are
those which allow non-seamen to recover from the shipowner for
defects in the ship's equipment.
In Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson,8 the Supreme Court held that
the owner's warranty of seaworthiness extends to equipment supplied by a stevedoring company. Until Petterson it had been repeatedly held that unseaworthiness arises either from a condition of
the ship itself or from an appliance of the ship. 19 Petterson, however, departed from the traditional and logical definition of seaworthiness. Libelant, Petterson, was injured when a snatch-block
broke. The block belonged to a stevedoring company and was
brought on board by them. It was not a part of the ship's equipment, but, unlike the situation in Metzger, it was attached to the
ship and thus became an appurtenant appliance. The district
court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the shipowner contended that
his warranty of seaworthiness did not extend to equipment supplied
by another. This argument was rejected on the authority of
Sieracki, which was cited for the proposition that the shipowner's
duty is one he cannot delegate. The shipowner then argued that
he should not be liable because he had relinquished control of the
vessel to the stevedore. Before Sieracki, the Second Circuit had
held that a shipowner is not liable for unseaworthiness which arises
after he surrenders control of the vessel to someone else.2 0 The
court reasoned, however, that this doctrine was founded upon the
theory that the shipowner's liability is based upon negligence.
Since Sieracki made it clear that the shipowner's liability is absolute,
the major premise of the doctrine was incorrect and could not
control Petterson. 2 1 Thus, the court of appeals, on the authority of
Sieracki and Pope & Talbot, reversed holding that the vessel was
unseaworthy. The Supreme Court, also on 2the authority of Sieracki and Pope & Talbot, affirmed per curiam. 2
The abrupt manner in which the majority handled Petterson
makes it impossible to determine just what the Court wants the
case to stand for. An indication of what the majority may have
had in mind is a reference to the discussion in Sieracki of the nonLongshoremen's & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 901 (1964). Sieracki interpreted this statute as not precluding
recovery against a third party-in this case against a shipowner for breach
of the warranty of seaworthiness.
17. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
18. 347 U.S. 396 (1953) (per curiam).

19. 2

NoRRIs,

THE LAW

OF

SEAMEN,

§§ 609-14 (1952);

ADMIRALTY, 301-7 (1939).

20.

ROBINSON,

Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1945); Mullica v.

Compania Sud-Americana, 202 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1953).

& BLACK,

21.

GILMORE

22.

347 U.S. 396 (1954)

LAW OF ADMIRALTY,

(per curiam).

§

6-42 (1957).
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delegability of the shipowner's duty. The inference is that the majority agreed with the court of appeal's conclusion that the absolute
and nondelegable duty announced in Sieracki was inconsistent with
the relinquishment of control doctrine which the second circuit had
applied. 23 A strong dissent2 4 contended that Sieracki and Pope &
Talbot did not justify the Court's decision. While these cases held
that the shipowner's absolute liability to his crew extended to
others working on the ship, the defective equipment in each case
was the ship's equipment. The cases did not even suggest that liability should run beyond the seaworthiness of the vessel and its
equipment. The dissent noted:
While the doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness . . . is reasonable enough when applied to a shipowner in relation to his own ship and to its equipment,
there is no comparable justification for applying it to
equipment owned by others and brought on board by
them. Thus to extend such absolute liability would make
the shipowner responsible for the result of latent dangers he cannot prevent. The burden should be upon those
best able to eliminate
the hazard-in this case, the steve2
doring contractor. .
The doctrine of seaworthiness is an outgrowth of the crew's
dependence upon the seaworthiness of the ship and its equipment.
To protect the crew, the law imposed absolute liability upon shipowners for the unseaworthiness of either the ship or its equipment.26 Does the crew depend upon the shipowner for the seaworthiness of equipment supplied by a stevedore? It would seem
that they depend upon the stevedoring company, and, unless the
shipowner agrees to substitute the stevedore's equipment for his
own, the shipowner's responsibility in such cases should extend
only to exercising reasonable care in selecting the stevedore. Nevertheless, the Petterson doctrine allows seamen to recover from the
shipowner for defects in equipment supplied by others.
Since the common law doctrine of liability without fault is limited to situations where the defendant has some control over the
instrumentality, 27 Petterson would appear to make the shipowner
an insurer. There is little doubt, at least, that courts have been
28
going to extremes in finding a ship to be unseaworthy.
The question presented in Metzger is not well settled. It is not
clear just how far the shipowner's liability is to extend. In Italia
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

& BLACK, LAW OF
347 U.S. 396 (dissent).
Id. at 401 (dissent).
Id. at 399 (dissent).
GILMORE

ADMIRALTY,

§ 6-42 (1957).

PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 135, 186-89 (1953).
28. Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941) (soapy shower
floor); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 108 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. N.Y. 1952)
(vicious crew members).
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Soc'y v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,2 9 the Supreme Court said:
[T] he ship owner is liable for unseaworthiness ...
whenever the ship or its gear is not reasonably fit for the
purpose for which it was intended and this liability extends to longshoremen and others who work aboard the
vessel, including those in the employ of contracting stevedoring companies.3 0
This statement does not say that defective equipment furnished by
a stevedoring company renders the ship unseaworthy. Quite the
contrary, the shipowner's obligation is stated as including only his
ship or its equipment. As authority for this statement in Italia
the Supreme Court cited Sieracki and Pope & Talbot. It would appear that the Court had finally stated the rule of these two cases
correctly. Therefore, the next logical step would be to overrule
Petterson. In Italia, however, the Court, by dictum, reaffirmed
Petterson.
Forkin v. Furness Withy Co. 31 presents a contrary view. In
order to unload baggage, a longshoreman was preparing to attach a
conveyor belt to the side port of a recently docked vessel. He
passed a rope sling around the conveyor and then stood upon it.
As a crane operator moved him toward the ship the rope broke,
and the longshoreman fell into the water. The crane was shore
based. Both the crane and the rope were owned by the stevedoring company, and the conveyor was never attached to the ship. In
a suit against the shipowner, the longshoreman alleged that the
ship was unseaworthy. The district court dismissed the suit.
The second circuit, affirming said:
Equipment maintained on a pier to establish connection with a ship is not an 'appliance appurtenant to the
ship' or 32a part of the ship's 'gear,' at least until it has been
affixed.
While this is certainly a more logical approach to the problem
than Petterson, it is submitted that both views are incorrect. Carried to its logical conclusion, Petterson would make the shipowner
an insurer against every accident occurring on or near his ship.
In effect, it will no longer be essential to prove the unseaworthiness
of the vessel. Forkin, however, would make unseaworthy only
that which is actually affixed to the ship. Under this view, the S.S.
Kirsten Torm would not be unseaworthy, for neither the crane,
boom or sling was even affixed to the ship.
The real test of unseaworthiness should be made to depend
upon whether or not the equipment supplied by the stevedore is
ever affixed to the ship, or, if not affixed, whether or not the equip29.
30.
31.
32.

376 U.S. 315 (1964).
Id. at 317 (Emphasis added.)
323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 641.
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ment used by the stevedoring company is such equipment as is generally carried on the ship. If Petterson is understood to hold that
the shipowner's duty is non-delegable, then, if the stevedore's
equipment is such as is found on the ship, the owner will be responsible for its defects. But if the stevedore's equipment is not
the type ordinarily used on ships, it would seem that Petterson
should be inapplicable. The shipowner had no duty to insure the
safety of such equipment in the first place.
Where the defective equipment is shore based, not incorporated
into the ship or its equipment, and is not such equipment as is generally carried on a ship, the district courts are in general agree3
ment that such equipment does not render the ship unseaworthy. 3
When a shipowner permits a stevedoring company to use its
own equipment, thereby permitting a substitution for warranted
ship's equipment, it is reasonable to conclude that the owner thereby adopts the substitute as his own. The shipowner's duty is to
3 4
insure the safety of his crew by providing seaworthy equipment.
If he may escape liability by using the stevedore's equipment he
will not be encouraged to provide comparable ship equipment that
is safe and adequate. He should not be allowed to relieve himself
of his duty so easily. The equipment of the stevedore must be considered to have been incorporated into the ship's regular gear. The
shipowner, consenting to the substitution, has thereby adopted the
equipment as his own and warranted it as seaworthy.
This "similar equipment rule" will confine the issue to unseaworthiness rather than questioning whether or not the equipment
has become an appurtenance of the ship. When applied to
Metzger, this rule would correctly render the S.S. Kirsten Torm
unseaworthy. The equipment used by the stevedoring company
was similar to the ship's equipment. In this case the owner relied
upon the stevedore's equipment and, in fact, had neglected his
duty to insure the safety of similar ship equipment. The Kirsten
Torm's owner admitted that the ship's boom, crane, and slings
were not being used because they were neither adequate nor safe
for the load. Since the owner had neglected his duty to provide
seaworthy equipment, 35 it follows that the ship was unseaworthy.
Had safe and adequate equipment been provided it would have
been unnecessary to use the stevedore's equipment and the accident
33. McKnight v. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D.
Ohio 1960), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913
(1961); Sherbin v. S.G. Embiricos Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1962)

(grain trimmer); Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 719

(E.D. La. 1964) (marine leg); Cockrell v. A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc.,
192 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Tex. 1961) (shore-based loading spout); Forkin v.
Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963) (conveyor).

34.

347 U.S. at 399 (dissent).

U.S. 85 (1946).

35. Ibid.

See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
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may not have occurred.
While the correct result was reached in Metzger, the court's
reasoning is unsound. The district court found the Kirsten Torm
unseaworthy by reasoning that the shore based crane was an appurtenance of the ship. 3 This is unwise. If this reasoning is followed, any equipment used by a stevedoring company, whether on
ship or shore based, whether similar to ship equipment or not, may
be considered an appurtenance. If such equipment then causes an
accident, the ship will be considered unseaworthy. The absurdity
of such a doctrine is illustrated when equipment used by the stevedore is entirely foreign to the ship. Sherbin v. S.G. Embirices,
Ltd.37 is an example. Libelant was injured by a grain trimmer.
A grain trimmer is a large piece of equipment used to shoot grain
into a ship's hold. They are owned and operated by stevedoring
companies and are not found upon ships. The suit was dismissed
by the district court because the grain trimmer was not such equipment as is generally carried on a ship. It is not reasonable to conclude that a shipowner warrants such equipment when it never
was and never will be a part of the ship or an appurtenant appliance. If courts held shipowners responsible for defects in such
equipment the courts would be encouraging negligence on the part
of the stevedore. Since the stevedore is the owner he is in a better
position to inspect the equipment. If the shipowner, who is not in
an ideal position to make the inspection, is held responsible, the
stevedore will be less inclined to inspect the equipment.
It is generally held that equipment, to be covered by the shipowner's warranty, must be of the type which is also a part of the
ship's hull, gear, stowage, and appurtenant equipment. 38 However, this rule should not be so rigidly construed so as to exclude
from its scope new and modern labor saving methods and machinery. 39 The test is not whether the equipment is that which has
traditionally been used. The test is whether it is the type of
equipment regularly found and used upon ships.
Metzger is indicative of the trend established by past decisions.
This trend has been to constantly expand the shipowner's liability.
The real significance of Metzger lies in the fact that in this case
the Sieracki and Petterson doctrines have converged. The Sieracki
cases allow stevedores, longshoremen, and other non-seamen to sue
the shipowner for defects in the ship's equipment. Petterson al36. Cf. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
37. 200 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1962).
38. Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 719, (E.D. La.
1964); accord, McKnight v. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434
(N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 368 U.S.
913 (1961).
39. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965), accord, Huff v.
Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964); O'Hey v. Matson
Navigation Co., 135 Cal. App.2d 819, 288 P.2d 81 (1955).
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lows seamen to recover from the shipowner for defects in the stevedore's equipment.40 Metzger presents the rather unique situation
where these two extentions of the unseaworthiness concept have
combined to hold the vessel owner liable for a defect in a device
owned by a stevedoring company and which has injured one of the
company's own employees! The doctrines have crossed lines to
produce an incongruous result.
The rather sad state of United States maritime affairs indicates that some of the historic protections afforded shipowners are
not outdated and if the industry is to survive, apart from federal
ownership, there ought to be a review of the rationale and application of some of the elements of protection afforded by early maritime law to encourage investment in the instrumentalities of seagoing commerce.
Carried to its logical conclusion, Metzger will make the owner
an insurer against accident. It is submitted, however, that even the
Supreme Court is unwilling to go this far. Indeed, there is some
indication that a trend away from cases such as Petterson may be
developing. What would the owner's liability be if the vessel,
leaving port in a seaworthy condition, is rendered unseaworthy by
an unusual storm at sea? If the ship's equipment is weakened by
the storm, fails, and a seaman is injured, is the owner responsible?
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.41 suggests that he is not. This case
indicates a relaxation of Petterson. The court said:
What had been said is not to suggest that the owner
is obligated to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is
absloute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The
standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a
ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea,42but a vessel reasonably suited for her intended service.
Another indication of a willingness to deviate from expansion
of the seaworthiness concept is Morales v. City of Galveston.43 A
divided court held that wheat contaminated with noxious chemicals and loaded into the ship's hold did not render the ship unseaworthy. Despite the fact that the ship's hold was not well ventilated, the court reasoned that the ship was seaworthy because her
intended purpose was to take on uncontaminated grain, and for
that purpose she was fit.
In view of these recent cases it is likely that future Supreme
Court decisions will at least narrowly construe Sieracki and Petterson. It is submitted that the combination of these two doctrines in
40. Cf., Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964).
41. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
42. Id. at 550. (Emphasis added.)
43. 370 U.S. 165 (1962).

Summer 1966]

RECENT CASES

Metzger may not meet with Supreme Court approval, and it is
hoped that future decisions will also repudiate Sieracki and Petterson and adopt a more logical standard. A line limiting the shipowner's liability must be drawn somewhere, no matter how difficult a task this may be.44 Considering the trend of Sieracki,
Petterson and Metzger, it is possible to imagine a situation where
the shipowner is held responsible for injuries occurring at a considerable distance from the ship. The possibility of such a result
makes it clear that the Supreme Court should clearly establish a
limit beyond which the warranty of seaworthiness should not be
45
extended.
DAVID C. CLEAVER

44. The third circuit recognized this problem in Spann v. Lauritzen,
344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965), wherein it was said: "subordinate federal
courts have encountered difficulty in drawing the line. . .

45. The
delineate the
(1961). The
consideration

."

Id. at 205.

Supreme Court failed to exercise an opportunity to clearly
limits of the warranty in Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20
court's determination of the "in navigation" question made a
of the unseaworthiness problem unnecessary.
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